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Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace 
Trotter Hardyt 
Consider the problems of copyright and patents. If a 
new idea is freely appropriable by all, if there exist 
communal rights to new ideas, incentives for developing 
such ideas will be lacking. . . . All problems of 
externalities are closely analogous to those which arise 
in the land ownership example. The relevant variables 
are identical. 1 
"Property in Cyberspace" invokes two notions: property and 
cyberspace. I use the latter term as a shorthand way of referring 
to computer communications generally. Today, much of that com-
munication takes place over the Internet, the global aggregation 
of several million computers that all share common .communica-
tions standards and pass communications like electronic mail 
and digital files among themselves by adhering to that standard. 
The usefulness of the term "cyberspace" is precisely that it does 
not confine us to the Internet, but instead lets us talk more gen-
erally in a way that includes the so-called "online services," such 
as Prodigy, CompuServe, and America Online. 
Cyberspace is not a real "place," of course, and tangible ob-
jects do not exist "there." But a great deal of valuable stuff cur-
rently exists in the form of digital information that can be sent 
through cyberspace. There are the obvious things like computer 
software, sound recordings, novels, and pictures. There are also 
trade secrets, credit-card account numbers, maps, and other ref-
erence works like encyclopedias, journals, and the like. In fact, 
nearly any sort of information, including telephone conversations, 
television an~ radio signals, and motion pictures, can be convert-
ed to a digital stream of bits and hence can be transmitted 
through cyberspace. 
t Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. Thanks for helpful comments 
to David Post, Michael Froomkin, and Mark Lemley. Special thanks to my research 
assistant, Anji Plichta. I am responsible for what I say, of course. 
1 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347, 359 . 
(1967). 
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All of these various things might be subject to limitations on 
what others may do to and with them, and that brings us to the 
second notion of this Article: property. A limitation on what oth-
ers may do with digital information might well take the form of 
some sort of property right. Indeed, we already have something 
like property rights for many such "informational works" under 
the rubric of copyright law, trade-secret law, patent law, and 
perhaps even trademark and unfair-competition. law. For the 
most part, however, the significant issues center on the protec-
tion of "informational works," which a:(e generally considered 
part of the subject matter of copyright. I will focus on such works 
and not consider issues better addressed under trademark or 
trade-secret theories. 
Since the topic of this Article is property in cyberspace, not 
copyright in cyberspace, the Article analyzes several issues from 
a perspective broader than copyright alone. Copyright is only one 
of several incentives that encourage the production of informa-
tional works in general, and digital works in particular. Other 
incentives include technical restrictions on copying, such as satel-
lite-signal "scrambling." Part I puts these various incentives into 
a taxonomy that will be useful as a framework with which to 
analyze the incentives that encourage the production of informa-
tional works. This taxonomy helps to explain many of the current 
pressures on Congress to expand copyright rights. 
An examination of "property'' in cyberspace leads naturally 
to an examination of property theory generally.2 Part II looks at 
a strain of this theory that derives directly from an influential 
article by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed.3 This section 
summarizes their seminal article and its analysis of the various 
ways that a society can protect "entitlements." As it turns out, 
the Copyright Act includes all three of the protections that 
Calabresi and Melamed analyze. 
In Part Ill, I look at a very different strain of property theo-
ry: an economic approach. Harold Demsetz wrote the seminal 
2 AB I note in the text, I only examine a few seminal works in property theory. The 
literature on property theory is far larger than I canvass here. For an overview, see C.B. 
MacPherson, ed, Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (University of Toronto, 
1978); Samuel L. Blumenfeld, ed, Property in a Humane Economy (Open Court, 1974). For 
a discussion of the economics of property rights, see Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of 
Property Rights (Cambridge, 1989); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of 
Private Property (Kluwer Academic,.1993); Henry G. Manne, ed, The Economics of Legal 
Relationships (West, 1975). 
3 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972). 
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article in this area;4 his work has recently been elaborated by 
Robert Ellickson.5 Together, these two writers offer a perspective 
on property that emphasizes the costs of drawing and monitoring 
property boundaries, and the costs of bargaining and negotiating 
over the use of property when it is held in common instead of 
privately. 
In Part IV, I take the Calabresi and Melamed approach and 
apply it to the protection of informational works in cyberspace. I 
show that a principal characteristic of property rules-that we 
rely on them in situations of low transaction costs-applies to 
cyberspace, because cyberspace lowers the cost of communicating 
and, hence, of transacting over rights to use private property. To 
the extent that new forms of transactions arise whose value and 
costs we cannot foresee, a property rule again makes sense, be-
cause it offers the mostflexibility. 
I then apply the Demsetz-Ellickson analysis to the protection 
of informational works in cyberspace. Their theories, derived in 
the context of physically possessed tracts of land, reveal interest-
ing analogues when applied to "property'' in informational works 
in cyberspace. The costs of drawing and monitoring the ''borders" 
of a unit of cyberspace informational property, for example, ap-
pear to be no higher than for other informational works, and they 
may be even lower because of new cyberspace technologies. The 
cost of group decision making, a significant problem for group 
ownership of land, also poses a problem for "group ownership" of 
informational works. The Demsetz-Ellickson economic perspective 
argues persuasively in favor of a regime of private property in 
cyberspace. A property regime more narrowly defined than under 
current copyright laws-more "privatized"-would offer consider-
able savings in group negotiating and bargaining costs. Though 
politically difficult to achieve, the resulting savings would be · 
desirable. 
I. A TAXONOMY OF INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATIONAL WORKS 
To talk of "property" in "cyberspace" is to raise the question: 
why property? Why do we invoke the notion of property and what 
good does it do? I take three observations as my starting point in 
this inquiry. First, in cyberspace we primarily care about digital 
"information." Second, one person can make use of information 
• See Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev 347 (cited in note 1). 
• See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 1315 (1993). 
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without depriving another of the same use.6 Finally, information 
frequently is much cheaper to copy than to create, and digital 
information is often even cheaper to copy than other forms of 
information. 
This latter point merits elaboration. Much of the exploitation 
of informational works today does not. depend directly on "copy-
ing." Online information services, such as Westlaw, Nexis, many 
World Wide Web sites, and, to some extent, America Online and 
Prodigy, do not sell information in "copies" so much as they sell 
access to information. 7 Other ventures also may arise in 
cyberspace that deliver information in digital streams without 
permanent fixation at all, such as "music on demand" services. 
To the extent that these are money-making ventures, they may 
not charge for "copies," but rather for access or immediate per-
formance. They may be supported by advertising revenue or may 
evolve into as yet unthought-of means of earning revenue. In 
short, many commentators argue that a focus on "copying'' may 
be outdated for informational works in cyberspace.8 
For purposes of discussing property in cyberspace, I disagree. 
Although I recognize the importance of these other uses of.infor-
mation, I think that commercial information providers do not 
only fear unauthozized access-a kind of "shoplifting." They also 
fear the possibility that others will copy large aggregates of infor-
mation and use these copies to compete against the original pro-
vider-a more serious kind of "free riding." Thus, a concern for 
the production of informational works is still fundamentally a 
concern about the ease of copying such works. 
Conventional wisdom argues that informational works, be-
cause they exhibit such a low ratio of copying-to-creating costs, 
must be protected by copyright, or else no one will take the time 
or trouble to produce them in the first place. As the Supreme 
Court has put it, authors need an incentive because "[s]acrificial 
days devoted to ... creative activities deserve rewards commen-
surate with the services rendered."9 At best, however, this con-
clusion is a half truth. It is more accurate to say that informa-
tional works-and for that matter, any nontrivial creative ef-
6 Thus physical control over a particular tangible embodiment of information may 
not suffice to control others' uses of the same information. This description identifies in-
formation as a "public good." See notes 89-111 and accompanying text. 
7 Raymond T. Nimmer and Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Copyright on the Information 
Superhighway: Requiem for a Middleweight, 6 Stan L & Policy Rev 25 (1994). 
8 See id at 32. 
• Mazer v Stein, 347 US 201, 219 (1954). 
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forts-require the existence of an incentive for their creation. 
Whether the incentive necessarily must be copyright is a differ-
ent matter. To make that determination, we must look at other 
types of incentives. 
Rather than look at every sort of incentive, however, I will 
develop a taxonomy of the incentives that apply to most informa-
tion producers, regardless of whether they are large, small, com-
mercial, not-for-profit, or individual. Because I want a broadly 
applicable analysis, I will omit from my discussion incentives 
that apply only to narrow segments of the "authoring'' public, 
such as government or ,Private grants. Few of these types of in-
centives are given relative to the number of informational works 
created, and, consequently, they will likely play a very minor role 
in the future. 
I will also omit from this taxonomy incentives that generally 
cut in favor of broad and unrestricted copying. For example, one 
type of incentive to create an informational work is that of "per-
sonal pride," "self-fulfillment," or "desire for self-expression." A 
related incentive for university professors is to achieve recogni-
tion through widespread distribution of their scholarly work. 
Both of these incentives remain unaffected by the prospect of 
widespread copying, and they therefore tend to diminish the need 
for restrictions on copying. Similarly, the producer of a 
cyberspace "publication" supported by advertising or by collateral 
services, such as updates or special types of access, may encour-
age the copying of the initial publication. 
I do not undervalue incentives that favor wide copying, but I 
do not discuss them here for three reasons. First, personal moti-
vations like "self-expression," though of obvious importance in the 
creation of many World Wide Web "home pages" today, are none-
theless far removed from the focus of this Article on "property'' in 
cyberspace. 
Second, to the extent that a business depends on informa-
tional works of some kind, incentives for unrestricted copying are 
still not likely to affect the underlying concern that others not 
copy one's entire operation and means of doing business. For 
example, a business entity might give away a certain amount of 
content as a kind of advertising, but earn revenue by charging 
for access to an updating database. Though such a company 
would not try to restrict copying of the "advertising'' materials, it 
certainly would want to prevent the copying of its updating data-
base-the means by which it stays in business. 
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Third, and crucially important, the availability of a means to 
limit copying is not a two-way street. If an information producer 
has a means to restrict copying, but prefers, for whatever reason, 
not to restrict copying, then the producer can simply not assert or 
take advantage of that means. In other words, such a means 
allows those who want and need to restrict copying to do so, and 
it allows those who do not want to restrict copying to refrain 
from doing so. 10 But the converse is not true. The lack of a 
means to limit copying will satisfy those who do not want or need 
it, but it cannot satisfy those who do. The asymmetry means that 
we will be less likely to go wrong if w~ focus on incentives for 
limiting the copying of informational works than if we focus on 
contrary incentives. 
We can find the typical incentives that face most information 
producers by asking what information producers need to over-
come their fears of cheap copying. The general answer is not 
"copyright law," because that reflects too narrow a conception. 
The better answer is that would-be producers of information need 
some assurance that copying will be limited. The notion of "some 
assurance" rather than "complete assurance" reflects the fact that 
100 percent assurance of anything-or zero risk-has never been 
a requirement of any business. Similarly, I use the deliberately 
vague notion of "limited" copying rather than "no copying'' be-
cause the exact amount of copying that an information producer 
will tolerate will vary widely depending on the type of informa-
tion being produced, the goals of the producer, and so on. 
For example, some products, such as commercial business 
software, apparently can be profitable even with a fairly large 
amount of illegal copying, as long as "most" or "many" copies are 
lawfully purchased. Prices would be lower in the absence of copy-
ing, of course, and we accordingly would be better off if all copy-
ing could cheaply be prevented. But business-software sellers in 
fact enter software markets that exhibit some amount of copy-
ing-hence they must expect the existence of "limited copying," 
not "zero copying." Other sellers of software, such as those who 
produce so-called "shareware"· products, tolerate an estimated 90 · 
percent unauthorized copying of their products. For these produc-
ers, the "self-expression" or "personal fulfillment" rationales may 
indeed play a large part. But for my purposes, the shareware 
10 All rights can be waived except those that are protected by a rule of inalienability. 
Fortunately, such rules play a very modest role in the protection of most information 
products. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
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example illustrates that these producers still expect copying to be 
limited-even if the ''limits" are quite modest. 
Given, then, that producers of information products need 
some assurance that copying will be limited, the next question is 
how producers obtain that assurance. In other words, how do 
they "limit" copying? This question is best answered by looking at 
the aggregate combination of four factors: 1) entitlement-like pro-
tection; 2) contract-like protection; 3) state-of-the-art limitations; 
and 4) special-purpose technical limitations. 11 Other factors also 
could be listed;12 I do not mean that these four are exclusive, 
but rather that they seem intuitively important enough to merit 
particular attention. In any event, nothing will be lost by a sim-
plified analysis because my essential points do not depend on the 
exact number of factors. 
I will describe each of these four factors in turn. The first 
factor is "entitlement-like· protection." By this I mean the wide 
·recognition that informational products have an "owner" and that 
this owner has some "rights" that would be violated by unautho-
rized copying of the product. Such rights inhere in the product or 
the owner and are binding on the world in general; they are not 
a matter of contract. I could call them "property-like" rights, be-
cause in one sense they are just that. But, I want to analyze the 
issues under the Calabresi and Melamed approach that discusses 
protecting entitlements through "property, liability, and inalien-
ability rules. "13 Calabresi and Melamed use the term "property" 
in a narrower sense than "entitlement," and I will stick with 
their usage for both terms. 
11 I first described this taxonomy in print--actually, "in electrons"-in Trotter Hardy, 
Contracts, Copyrights, and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 Richmond J L Tech art 2, 
. paragraphs 6-10 (1995) (available online at http://www.urich.edu/-jolt/vlillhardy.txt). The 
Richmond Journal, nicknamed "JOLT," is the first student-edited law journal, and per-
haps the first law journal of any kind, to appear solely in an online format. 
12 Another factor that plays into a publisher's decision, but that is not so easily 
characterized as a "limitation on copying," is the ease with which copying can be detected. 
Assume two different media or technologies exist for releasing informationto the public. 
Suppose that one medium can be copied without detection and that the other cannot be 
copied without leaving a "trace" of some sort. If all other aspects are the same, informa-
tion producers would tend to favor the second form of release. 
Still another factor might be lead time. Once a copyable work is released, it may not 
be possible for others to copy or use it instantly. Thus lead time serves as a limitation on 
such copying. The amount of lead time so obtained is, of course, a function of the state-of-
the-copying art. 
13 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1089 (1972) (cited in note 
3). 
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The second limitation on copying arises from contract. In 
contrast to the entitlement regime, a contract regime protects 
information only because two or more parties have agreed to 
treat the product. as protected. Those who are not a party to any 
such contract are not bound by its terms. For example, all of the 
online vendors, such as America Online, CompuServe, and Lexis 
Counsel Connect, have "terms of service" that specify copyright 
rights in the materials available on or uploaded to the service. 
Lexis Counsel Connect even specifies the terms of copyright in 
users' e-mail, neatly side-stepping many of the otherwise vexing 
questions about copyright in e-mail. 
One might ask whether "entitlement" incentives and "con-
tract" incentives are really separate. After all, the owners of 
entitlements depend on contracts such as license agreements and 
publication agreements to exercise their rights of entitlement. 
But contracts relating to informational works come in two types: 
those for which an information entitlement serves as consider-
ation for the agreement, and those for which the consideration 
lies elsewhere. In the first type. of contract, the contract is indeed 
the means by which an entitlement is used to gain remuneration. 
In effect, such contracts exist to waive or transfer what would 
otherwise be the owner's exclusive rights. In these circumstances, 
contracts and entitlements go hand in hand. 
In the second type of contract, however, the contract either 
creates the owner's rights or clarifies them in the event that an 
entitlement is ambiguous. This happens, for example, when users 
of an information service such as Lexis or Westlaw sign an access 
agreement. Much of the information on these services consists of 
public-domain material: cases and statutes. Without a contract 
limiting the practice, the user of such a service could copy and 
resell the material. Contracts with the services provide other-
wise, of course, and these contracts are based not on any entitle-
ment to the public-domain information, but rather on the consid-
eration of allowing access to the service. When I say that "con-
tracts" provide a way of limiting information copying that is 
different from "entitlements," I am referring to this second type 
of contract-one in which something other than an information 
entitlement serves as consideration for the contract. 
After entitlements and contracts comes a third form of limi-
tation on copying-the state-of-the-copying a:rt. For any medium 
of expression, making a copy entails costs, yet obviously different 
media entail very different copying costs. Technological changes 
affect this cost. For example, if a manuscript must be written out 
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by hand to make a copy, the cost of doing so-in time, money, 
and "trouble"-imposes a natural limit on how many copies one 
will make of the manuscript. Similarly, a glossy magazine like 
the National Geographic can be photocopied on a photocopier, but 
this fact seems almost irrelevant to the National Geographic's 
plans for distribution. Readily accessible, inexpensive copy ma-
chines only produce black and white copies on poor quality paper. 
Photographs reproduce especially poorly. 
A photocopied National Geographic magazine therefore 
would be vastly inferior to the original. The possibility of wide:.. 
spread photocopying poses little practical risk to the National 
Geographic-and this would be true with or without the exis-
tence of copyright. Copyright may help to stop copiers from using 
more expensive, higher-quality reproduction technologies. But in 
the present state of the art, producing a ~opy of comparable qual-
ity to the original would likely cost as much or more than the 
current price of the magazine. Thus, copyright does not seem to 
play nearly as large a role in the limitation of National Geo-
graphic copying as does the current state-of-the-copying art. 
Finally, special-purpose technological restrictions can limit 
copying. A typical example of such self-help measures is the use 
by cable companies of signal "scrambling."14 For a home viewer 
to have access to certain channels, the viewer must pay the cable 
company for a piece of electronic equipment that will 
"descramble" the signal and render it viewable. This has nothing 
to do with the state-of-the-cable art: cable companies are able 
14 Another example of special-purpose technical restrictions now appears in the 
Copyright Act itself, added by the Audio Home Recording Act. 17 USC § 1002 (1994) 
(describing the Serial Copy Managment System). The·Clinton Administration's Working 
Group on Intellectual Property Rights describes this technical restriction in the following 
way: 
This Act requires that manufacturers of digital audio recording devices and digi-
tal audio interface devices incorporate features that limit serial copying. The 
hardware is programmed to read certain coding information contained in the 
"digital subcode channel" of digital sound recordings and broadcasts. Based on 
the information it reads, the hardware circuitry will permit unrestricted copy-
ing, permit copying but label the copies it makes with codes to restrict further 
copying, or disallow copying. The serial copy management system allows unlim-
ited first generation copying-digital reproduction of originals (such as CDs dis-
tributed by record companies), but prevents further digital copying from those 
reproductions. 
United States Department of Commerce, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellec-
tual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: Report of the Working Group 
on Intellectual Property Rights 179 (Sept 1995) (footnotes omitted) ("White Paper"). 
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with present technology to send a signal down the cable wire for 
viewing. Rather, it is the result of individual effort by the infor-
mation owner (or transmitter) to overcome what otherwise might 
be too little limitation from entitlement-like rules, unenforceable 
contracts, or a state-of-the-art that permits ready copying. 
The four-part taxonomy of incentives, then, consists of 
entitlements, contracts, the state-of-the-copying art, and special-
purpose technical restrictions. This way of looking at incentives 
shows several things. First, the existence of several limitations 
means that assurances of limited copying can come from a vari-
ety of sources-copyright law is by no means the only one. Tech-
nical restrictions can also matter a great deal. In some situa-
tions, such as when online vendors deal with paying customers, 
contract restrictions can be effective as well. 
Second, the four-part taxonomy reveals that what matters to 
information producers is the aggregate amount of assurance of 
limited copying-not "copyright" or technology or contracts alone. 
Moreover, this aggregate amount will vary in its individual com-
ponents with different informational products. The producers of 
the WordPerfect word-processing program surely have different 
views about the relative importance of copyright and the state-of-
the-copying art than does the National Geographic magazine. 
The state-of-the-art permits a quick and perfect copying of the 
WordPerfect software; it permits only a crude and ineffective 
copying of the National Geographic magazine. 
It is helpful to think of this four-part "aggregate assurance" 
of limited copying in the form of a pie chart. One slice of the "pie" 
represents the limitations inhering in the "state-of-the-copying 
art," another represents "entitlement-like" protection, and so on. 
The overall size of the pie-the sum of all four factors-is what 
matters to information producers, because the overall size deter-
. mines how limited the unauthorized copying of their product will 
be. 
A third consequence of using this four-part taxonomy is per-
haps· the most significant. The taxonomy implies that if one of 
the "slices" of the pie grows or shrinks, other slices must shrink 
or grow proportionally if the producer is to preserve the same 
overall assurance of limited copying. 
The relative size of a slice can change· for several reasons. 
One reason is technological development. Such developments 
obviously affect both the state-of-the-copying art and special-
purpose technological restrictions. Return to the National Geo-
graphic example and suppose that the technology of color copying 
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advances tomorrow to the point that high-quality color copies, 
complete with heavy covers, glossy pages, and automatic binding, 
are possible at very low cost. 15 This would represent a sharp 
change in the current state-of-the-copying. art. In view of this 
change, National Geographic might well change its views about 
the importance of the other slices. In order to assure the same 
aggregate amount of limitation on copying, National Geographic 
might, for example, do what the Treasury Department currently 
does with paper money16 and introduce special-purpose technical 
restrictions to make copying more difficult. 17 
Let's take another illustration, this time of changing legal 
developments. Suppose a business enterprise started up some 
years ago offering printed compilations of factual information. 
Let us suppose that this enterprise had good reason to rely on 
the copyright law at that time to prevent others from copying and 
selling its products. 18 In short, the "entitlement-like" slice of the 
protection pie . that arose from copyright law was significantly 
large. Now, move forward in time to a point after the Supreme 
Court decided Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service 
Co., 19 which held that compilations resulting solely from the 
"sweat of the brow" are not original enough for copyright protec-
tion.20 Suddenly, the "copyright" slice of limitation for our seller 
of factual information has shrunk to the vanishing point. The 
enterprise, in order to stay in business, will have to turn to some 
other form of copying limitation-perhaps contract or technologi-
cal restrictions such as using paper that does not photocopy well. 
Thus, the four-part taxonomy reveals the relationship of the 
different forms of limitations on copying to each other and illus-
15 Ironically, I am writing this paragraph the day after Hewlett Packard introduced a 
new and very low-cost, color copy machine. The machine lacks the quality and features I 
hypothesize in the text, but it does illustrate how rapidly technology can change the land-
scape. 
16 The Treasury Department recently announced a new one-hundred dollar bill. 
Design changes to the bill will make it harder to copy. For example, the bill will feature, 
among other things, lines so fine and so close together that they will not reproduce well 
on ordinary copying machines. $100 Question: Will Ben's New Look Stop Counterfeits? NY 
Times Dl9 (Sept 28, 1995). 
17 The Treasury Department's increased special-purpose restrictions can similarly be 
. seen as a reaction to the evolution in the state-of-the-photocopying art toward better and 
cheaper color copies. 
18 See, for example, Leon v Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F2d 484, 486-87 
(9th Cir 1937); National Business Lists, Inc. v Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F Supp 89, 92-
93 (ND Ill 1982). 
19 499 us 340 (1991). 
20 Id at 359-60. 
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trates the importance of their aggregate protection to information 
producers. Cyberspace shrinks-very dramatically-the slice of 
limitation represented by the "state-of-the-copying art." This 
shrinking follows, in part, from the increasing digitization of 
information, a development that has proceeded rapidly for years 
independent of developments in the Internet. 
But the dawn of cyberspace ·puts renewed emphasis on digi-
tal information by opening huge doors to access from every cor-
ner of the globe.21 Cyberspace's current state-of-the-copying art 
seems to be one of both easy individual copying and easy mass 
distribution. 
With this particular slice of the limitations pie narrowing 
rapidly, information producers naturally will try to increase the 
size of the other slices in order to preserve their aggregate assur-
ance against copying. One of these slices consists of special-pur-
pose technical limitations on copying, such as encryption technol-
ogies. Indeed, the recent increased attention to encryption tech-
nologies22 can be explained as a consequence of the shrinking 
"state-of-the-art" part of the aggregation of limitations on copy-
ing.2a 
Finally, 24 attention these days also turns naturally to the 
"entitlements" slice of the taxonomy. We can learn much about 
entitlements in cyberspace from others who have examined 
entitlements in different contexts. I will look at two different 
analyses of property rights, both developed for contexts other 
than cyberspace: 1) Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed's 
famous discussion of property, liability, and inalienability 
rules;25 and 2) economic analysis of property rights begun by 
Harold Demsetz26 and expanded by Robert Ellickson. 27 These 
two bodies of work have different focuses. Calabresi and 
21 Though of obvious future importance, I do not directly address the question of how 
informational works can or should be protected intemationally. The principles I es-
pouse-essentially economic-should hold for most other cultures, but the likelihood that 
they will be adopted will vary widely. 
22 See, for example, A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the 
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U PaL Rev 709 (1995). 
23 Contract law is another slice that information producers may try to increase. See 
Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access· to Computers: Controlling Behavior in 
Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 Jurimet J 1 (1994). 
24 Contract restrictions are an important part of the taxonomy, but I will confine my 
attention to the remaining three. 
25 Calabresi & Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (cited in note 3). 
26 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347 (1967) 
(cited in note 1). 
27 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 1315 (1993) (cited in note 5). 
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Melamed start with the assumption that there exist 
"entitlements" that society wants to protect. They note that soci-
ety tends to protect such entitlements . in one of three 
ways-"property'' rules being one such way. Demsetz and 
Ellickson look more specifically to ownership of land, and they 
examine the question of when society creates privately owned 
parcels of land. Demsetz pioneered the economic approach to this 
question, putting the analysis in terms of minimizing negative 
externalities. Ellickson analyzes the question further and consid-
ers the circumstances under which societies hold property in the 
form of group ownership, versus those with which they hold 
property in the form of individual (or family) ownership. His 
analysis focuses on the relative ease of individuals in monitoring 
trespasses, compared to the difficulty that groups have in control-
ling shirking. 
II. CALABRESI AND MELAMED: THREE TYPES OF RULES 
Calabresi and Melamed assert that society protects 
entitlements through one of three ways: 1) "property rules"; 2) 
"liability rules"; or 3) "rules of inalienability."28 This three-part 
analysis has proven to be an extraordinarily-useful and widely-
applicable paradigm. 
A rule of inalienability states that an entitlement exists, but 
that it cannot be sold or bargained away under any circumstanc-
es. An example of such a rule outside the realm of informational 
works is the right to personal freedom. One may not sell this 
entitlement-that is, one may not, however willingly, sell oneself 
into slavery. In most, perhaps all, states there is a similar prohi-
bition on selling body parts or babies.29 
Surprisingly, copyright law also features an inalienability 
rule: the rule that prohibits authors from selling their "right of 
termination." Essentially, authors who contract to sell or license 
their works may, between thirty-five and forty years after the 
sale, "terminate" the contract and recover their copyright 
28 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972) (cited in note 3). 
29 For prohibitions against selling body parts, see, for example, DC Code § 6-2601 
(West 1981); Va Code § 32.1-289.1 (West 1993). For prohibitions against selling babies, 
see, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 63.212(d) (West 1995); 11 Del Code Ann § 1100 (West 
1994). 
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rights. 30 This right of "termination" (more accurately termed a 
right of "recision") may not, however, be waived or sold. 
Inalienability rules generate fascinating questions: why not 
allow people to sell body parts or babies? Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of considering property issues in cyberspace, inalienabili-
ty seems an unlikely attribute to apply to informational works. 31 
Such works do not seem to be laden with moral concerns com-
parable to those surrounding slavery or baby selling. So apart 
from the rather minor copyright provision about "termination" 
rights, no compelling reason presents itself for other rules of 
inalienability regarding informational works. I will therefore 
ignore such rules. 
Rules of property and rules of liability are more important 
for informational works. A "property'' rule, according to Calabresi 
and Melamed, protects an entitlement by requiring that would-be 
users or licensees of the entitlement reach a voluntary bargain 
with the owner.32 Use of the owner's property without such a 
voluntary agreement allows the owner to sue for damages and, 
significantly, for an injunction against further unauthorized use. 
A liability rule, in contrast, protects an entitlement by allow-
ing the owner to sue for damages after an unauthorized use, but 
it does not require that a voluntary bargain first be struck.33 A 
"rule of liability" explains cases like Ploof v Putnam.34 In Ploof, 
a boat owner tied his boat to a stranger's dock in a severe storm, 
but the dock owner's agent forcibly untied the boat and cast it 
loose, causing it and its crew to suffer damage in the storm. Un-
der normal circumstances, the dock owner would have a "proper-
ty'' entitlement that would permit him to act just as he did. The 
boat owner could only use the dock after voluntary negotiation; 
absent such agreement, the dock owner would be free to cast the 
boat loose. 
30 17 USC§ 304(c) (1994). 
31 Patent law, alas, sees its share of these issues when questions arise as to the 
patentability of artificially modified-or created-living creatures or medical procedures. 
See, for example, Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 309 (1980) (upholding patentabili-
ty of petroleum-eating bacteria); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms 
of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 Yale L J 177 ( 1987) (addressing the application of 
patent law to biotechnology); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: 
The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 Md L Rev 1051 (1988). See also 
Special Equipment Co. v Coe, 324 US 370, 383-84 (1945) (Douglas dissenting) (expressing 
concern that the court should uphold a provision of the patent system allowing a patent 
holder to withhold his invention). . 
32 Calabresi & Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1092 (cited in note 3). 
33 Id. . 
34 71 A 188 (Vt 1908). 
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But in the presence of an emergency, such as a severe storm, 
Calabresi and Melamed note that we temporarily convert proper-
ty rules into a liability rule. The dock owner has no right to in-
sist that the boat owner voluntarily bargain over the use of the 
dock . .Indeed, the boat owner has an absolute right to remain tied 
to the dock to preserve life and limb. Yet, had the dock owner not 
cast the boat loose, and had the boat caused damage to the dock, 
the boat owner would. have been liable to the dock owner for the 
damage--a "liability rule."35 
A. Low Transaction Costs Lead to Property Rules 
Calabresi and Melamed's essential point about property 
rules-a point that is as applicable in cyberspace as anywhere 
else--is that they are most appropriate when the transaction 
costs of bargaining over the entitlement are low. In other words, 
when bargaining is feasible, a rule that requires "permission" 
ahead of time to use an entitlement will create voluntary ex-
changes that are more likely to bring about mutually beneficial 
results .. This is simply another way of looking at the economic 
presumption that voluntary exchange promotes economic efficien-
cy and is desirable in the absence of some affirmative reason to 
disallow it. 
Everyday forms of "property," such as cars, houses, washing 
machines, and stereos, fit this description. In Calabresi and 
Melamed's terms, the transaction cost incurred in buying and 
selling such items is very modest: the parties are easily identifi-
able ahead of time and few in number. A property entitlement for 
such items seems sensible. 
B. High Transaction Costs Lead to Liability Rules 
Liability rules, in contrast, are most suitable when transac-
tion costs are high, often because the parties are numerous or 
unidentifiable ahead of time. Automobile-accident cases are per-
haps the most straightforward example. All drivers have an "en-
titlement" to be free from other drivers crashing into them. But 
this entitlement is not a property right. That is, we do not insist 
that all drivers get together before they drive to bargain over 
what risks they will expose each other to, or the amount of com-
pensation they will pay should any of them violate another's 
35 See Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation Co, 124 NW 221, 109 Minn 456 (1910). 
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rights. The number of drivers makes it thoroughly impractical to 
impose such a requirement. Consequently, we use a liability rule. 
After the accident, a fact finder determines what the "entitle-
ment" to be free of accidents was worth, and payment will be 
compulsory. We adopt this approach because it is practical and 
the property rule is not. Thus, one can explain emergency situa-
tions, such as Ploof v Putnam, as special occasions where the 
costs of transacting are likely to go sky-high for the duration of 
the emergency. 
C. Copyright Law Includes Property Rules and Liability Rules 
Generally, both property and liability rules can apply to 
informational works. The Copyright Act, for example, consists of 
a mixture of both kinds of rules. Copyright rights provide that 
the author of a copyrightable work has a kind of property right in 
that work. Authors may license their novels' publication and 
distribution, or they may not; it is entirely voluntary on their 
part. They may refuse to license a would-be publisher, for what-
ever reason, and the law will protect their expectations with 
injunctive relief if necessary. Indeed, injunctions, even prelimi-
nary injunctions, are a common outcome in garden-variety copy-
right-violation cases. 36 
Yet the Copyright Act also includes strong threads of liabili-
ty-like rules. These take the form of "compulsory licenses" that 
govern certain uses of copyrighted materials. A compulsory li-
cense of long standing, for example, provides for the making of 
"cover records" of musical works. A "cover record" is a remake of 
an already recorded song or tune. Artists often rerecord popular 
tunes originally recorded by other artists. Such a rerecording and 
subsequent sale would ordinarily infringe the rights of the song's 
copyright owner to control reproduction and distribution. 
But under the detailed rules of section 115 of Title 17 United 
States Code, 37 the rerecording artist need not seek permission to 
make the cover record at all. Ratl;ter, the artist merely must 
notify the copyright owner and submit a statutorily prescribed 
fee. The copyright owner, in other words, has a right to "damag-
es" in the form of the fee specified by Congress, but no right to 
insist on voluntarily negotiated terms. 
36 See Paul Goldstein, 2 Copyright§§ 11.0, 11.2.1 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1996). 
37 17 usc§ 115 (1994). 
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Similar "liability'' rules apply to a cable television station's 
retransmission of broadcast-television signals;38 to a jukebox's 
playing of recording music;39 to the public performance of digital 
music;40 and, in a sense, to the fair-use provision.41 Interest-
ingly, Congress justified the copyright liability rules for cable 
television on the ground that Calabresi and Melamed would have 
predicted: they were necessary to overcome high transaction 
costs.42 
The fair-use copyright provision exempts certain activities, 
otherwise infringing, from being an infringement. Typically, such 
activities include copying small portions of a work for purposes of 
· criticism; spontaneous "last minute" copying of a news article for 
distribution to a school class; or taping a televised movie to 
watch at a later time. 
Fair use, for our purposes, can be seen as a kind of compul-
sory license-albeit one for which the payment required is exact-
ly zero dollars. Here too, one can justify the fair-use doctrine on 
grounds that Calabresi and Melamed would have argued: fair use 
applies when transaction costs make it impractical for parties to 
negotiate ahead of time.43 
38 The rules applicable to cable television are horrendously complicated, change fre-
quently, and are more a matter of telecommunications law under the aegis of the Federal 
Communications Comlnission ("FCC") than copyright law. But the Copyright Act elilninat-
ed any requirement that cable stations negotiate on a voluntary basis with the owners of 
copyrighted television programs, and it established a compulsory-license scheme. The li-
cense scheme required the cable station to place a percentage of its revenues in a copy-
right "pool" of such revenues. At the end of the year, a government agency (the now-dis-
continued Copyright Royalty Tribunal) would divide the pool among various claimants. 17 
usc§ 11l(d) (1994). 
39 The Copyright Act sets up a system of compulsory licensing for "coin-operated 
phonorecord players." 17 USC § 116. This system is administered silnilarly to the cable 
retranslnission compulsory license. 
40 The Copyright Act now provides· that certain digital studio translnissions of sound 
are noninfringing uses. A royalty is collected for such transmissions and paid to "featured 
musicians," although a small percentage is reserved for "non-featured musicians." 17 USC 
§ 1006(b) (1994). 
41 See 17 USC§ 107 (1994). 
42 In fact, transaction costs in cable-television licensing are not particularly high. 
Moreover, the market is quite good at overcolning such transaction costs, as music collec-
tive licensing societies like the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers 
("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music International ("BMI'') have shown. Nonetheless, even as 
a purported justification, the argument that we must meet transaction costs with liability 
rules instead of property rules is wholly consistent with the Calabresi and Melamed 
formulation. 
43 Wendy J. Gordan, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum L Rev 1600, 1628 (1982). 
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Thus, entitlements can be protected by rules of property or 
liability. Property rules are the "default" and are most suitable 
when transaction costs are modest, and liability rules are typical-
ly invoked when transaction costs are significant. In addition, 
these principles fit quite comfortably with our current rules for 
protecting "information entitlements"-that is, copyrights. 
Ill. DEMSETZ AND ELLICKSON: PRIVATE PROPERTY WHEN THE 
COST OF DRAWING AND MONITORING BORDERS Is LOW 
A. Private Property Versus Public Property 
Demsetz and Ellickson are not interested in distinguishing 
property rules from liability rules to enforce entitlements. Rath-
er, they are interested in discovering the circumstances that give 
rise to private-property interests as opposed to "community'' or 
group-held property. Ellickson, for example, distinguishes "pri-
vate property'' from group-held or "horde-owned" property. He 
argues that we turn to private-property rules when the cost of 
drawing and monitoring borders is low relative to the value of 
the property and relative to other means of enforcing socially 
desirable (efficient) outcomes.44 
Demsetz argues that private property arises when it is 
"worth it"-that is, when the institution of privately held proper-
ty is a cost-effective way for land users to internalize the costs 
and benefits of their use of the land.45 Both Demsetz and 
Ellickson also stress that private-property regimes function well 
to minimize deadweight losses for "small events." Small events 
are those with relatively few externalities, such as the planting 
and harvesting of crops. For such events, "public-property'' re-
gimes would require substantial coordination among members of 
the public, sharply raising transaction costs. Even if small events 
have some negative externalities, a private-property regime re-
duces the number of individuals who are negatively affected 
.. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 1315, 1327-1330 (1993) (cited 
in note 5). Ellickson uses the tenn "property" in a broad sense, to include "publicly held" 
property. He uses the term "private property" to mean individual or household-held land 
in contrast to "public property." ld at 1322. This use is consistent with Calabresi and 
Melamed's use of the tenn "property" in contrast to "liability." See Guido Calabresi and A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1092 (1972) (cited in note 3). 
45 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347, 350 
(1967) (cited in note 1). 
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and hence operates to keep transaction .costs below what they 
would be with group ownership.46 
Moreover, a public-ownership regime would require close 
monitoring of group members in order to prevent "shirking," an-
other increase in costs.47 A private-property regime eliminates 
the need for expensive monitoring of shirking. In effect, it "con-
verts" this costly activity into a much cheaper one: monitoring 
the simple act of "trespassing" across a boundary line.48 
Private property in land also puts the detection responsibility 
into the hands of a motivated party: the owner of the property. 
Private-property monitoring thus also solves a problem of exter-
nal benefits. Under a public-property regime, the group might 
develop rules about trespassing precisely to avoid the need for 
expensive monitoring. The group would have to appoint some 
sort of monitoring agent. But this agent would only bear a small 
portion of any losses from an unprevented trespass, and would 
thus face a diminished incentive to monitor. With a single prop-
erty owner, however, all of the losses fall on that one owner, who 
then has the proper incentive to monitor. This rationale for the 
existence of private property holds· true even when the property 
owner hires other employees, for example, to raise crops, a point 
that Ellickson does not mention. Even though monitoring is ex-
pensive in this latter case-because the owner must guard 
against the shirking of his own employees-the owner fully 
internalizes the gains and losses from such monitoring. 
Inexpensive monitoring does not result solely from the sim-
ple fact of drawing the boundary. The owner often must employ 
technologies to identify the boundary line unambiguous-
ly-through surveying, for example-and to detect and remedy 
trespasses. The cost of a fence can be one of the costs of prevent-
ing a trespass. All other things being equal, one would expect 
that cheaper "fencing'' technologies would increase fencing activi-
ty. Or as Ellickson puts it, as the costs of drawing, monitoring, 
and preventing entry to property fall, one can predict an increase 
in the amount of "parcelization" of property.49 This type of in-
crease followed the invention of barbed wire in the United States 
in the nineteenth century-more property was divided up into 
46 Id at 354-56; Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1327, 1332 (cited in note 5). 
47 Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1327-28 (cited in note 5). 
48 
"A key advantage of individual land ownership is that detecting the presence of a 
trespasser is much less demanding than evaluating the conduct of a person who is privi· 
leged to be where he is." Id at 1327 (emphasis in original). 
49 ld at 1328-30. 
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smaller parcels. 5° Future cyberspace technologies likely will ac-
complish an analogous result for informational works. 51 These 
results will take the form of control over access to small units of 
i:riformation like paragraphs or pages, rather than entire books or 
magazines. 
IV. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR "PROPERTY" APPLIED TO 
CYBERSPACE 
We have looked at two broad circumstances that justify 
society's reliance on some form of private-property rights when 
entitlements need protection: low transaction costs and low costs 
of drawing and monitoring boundary lines. We can now ask how 
these general considerations that argue for a property entitle-
ment apply in cyberspace. 
Briefly, the considerations argue strongly for a property 
entitlement. First, under a Calabresi and Melamed type of analy-
sis, trends in computer communications point to lower 
transaction costs overall, and hence favor a property regime for 
informational works. Second, under the private versus group-
owned property approach used by Demsetz and Ellickson, the 
costs of drawing and monitoring the boundaries of informational 
works in cyberspace seem no higher than for works outside of 
cyberspace. In some regards, they may even be cheaper. Again, 
this fact argues strongly for a regime of private property. 
A. Transaction Costs 
To see how the justifications for a property regime apply to 
cyberspace, we can start by applying the general justifications for 
property rules. Calabresi and Melamed argue that property 
entitlements are most appropriate when transaction costs are 
low. Are they low in cyberspace? We might not think so at first 
because cyberspace is so huge: millions of people, distributed over 
much of the world's physical surface, are engaged in communica-
tion that spans vast distances. Ordinarily this situation would 
suggest that transaction costs for any sort of bargaining would be 
enormous. But this is plainly wrong: cyberspace easily and cheap-
ly connects all these people together-people who previously 
"" ld at 1330 n 54 (citing Terry L. Anderson and P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property 
Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J L & Econ 163, 172 (1975)). 
51 See notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
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could not or would not have been in communication because of 
communication costs. 
If anything, cyberspace permits bargaining over distances 
and time that never before could have been possible. Cyberspace 
lowers the absolute amount of transaction costs relative to the 
· costs of the same transaction undertaken through some other 
means. This lowering occurs in three ways: 1) lower cost of com-
municating between people; 2) lower cost of computer recording 
of transaction data; and 3) lower communication costs facilitating 
institutional innovations like rights clearinghouses. 
I have experienced this cost lowering myself. When teaching 
a course in "The Law of Cyberspace,"52 I found an article by 
John PerryBarlow that I wanted to distribute to the class. If I 
had had to find a mailing address for Mr. Barlow and send a 
request through the U.S. mails, I doubt that I would have both-
ered to ask for permission-. and absent permission, I would not 
have reproduced the article for the class.53 As it was, however, 
the article listed his e-mail address, and accordingly, I sent an e-
mail request. Within a day or two, I received an answer authoriz-
ing me to make the reproductions I had requested. For this all-
too-familiar situation of requesting permission to make copies, 
cyberspace functioned as one might hope to reduce transaction 
costs and facilitate a beneficial transaction. 
Of course, this single observation does not tell us that all 
future online transactions will entail· lower costs relative to the 
"real" world. But cyberspace certainly appears to provide a cheap-
er means of communicating information than previous meth-
ods.54 Consequently, cyberspace should be at least as much, if 
not a more hospitable environment for transacting over property 
rights than "real" space, making a reliance on property rights 
even more suitable. 
~2 The course was taught-of course-over the Internet with students from several 
universities. 
63 I am familiar with the guidelines for educational photocopying and am aware that 
the reproduction I contemplated may have been a fair use. 
64 One of the hard-to-foresee facets of the problem is whether greater privatiza-
tion-{)r for that matter, nationalization-{)£ the Internet may result in higher costs. I can 
only guess that, as between lower and higher costs, the technological revolution that 
cyberspace represents seems more likely to continue the trend toward lower costs. 
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1. Transaction costs from computerization. 
Computers digitize and process all communication in 
cyberspace, either during a transmission or at the "end" point of 
a connection such as a Web site. Computers can record informa-
tion very accurately, and they can do it quickly. They can track 
small units of time, such as milliseconds and nanoseconds. They 
are therefore good at recording very brief transactions that might 
not be worth the· time and trouble to record in the absence of 
computers. With computer monitoring, the transaction costs of 
record keeping can be trivially low. In principle, therefore, all 
transactions in cyberspace could be logged and recorded55 at low 
cost. 
Suppose, for example, the owner of a Web site wanted to 
charge money for users' access to the site and for reading or 
. interacting with the information stored there. A charge could 
easily be levied on a per-second basis or on the basis of the dis-
play of a screenful of information. It would not matter that the 
briefest such visit might generate only a few pennies. These 
pennies could be aggregated over thousands of users and days, 
they could be recorded, and the funds (however small in quanti-
ty) could be transferred to the site owner's account automatically. 
The idea of paying a charge for reading only one page of a 
book may strike many people as odd. But per-page charges are a 
natural consequence of the use of computer technology to lower 
the cost of "parcelizing'' information-computer monitoring is a 
cheaper form of "fencing" than the printing press. 56 
The ability to record very fine-grained information about 
very fleeting transactions is yet another reason that transaction 
costs overall appear to be driven down in cyberspace. And again, 
falling transaction costs indicate a situation well-suited to a prop-
erty regime for the protection of informational works. 
2. Transaction costs depend on organizational innovation. 
Finally, we should note a crucial fact about transaction costs: 
they do not depend solely on technological changes, such as the 
Internet or computers. They also depend on institutional and 
organizational innovations. 57 The obvious past examples are the 
55 This fact gives pause to those who worry about invasions of privacy. I worry about 
it too, but this Article is about property, not privacy. 
56 The low cost of computer monitoring of very brief transactions has a parallel to 
land. Ellickson points out that with cheaper fencing, we should expect more "parcelized," 
or more finely subdivided, land. See Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 
1315, 1330 (1993) (cited in note 5). 
• 
57 See generally Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Prop-
217] PROPERTY (AND COPYRIGHT) IN CYBERSPACE 239 
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Producers 
("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music International ("BMI"). These 
organizations arose to arrange for music licensing and royalty 
payments between thousands of composers and thousands of 
music-playing establishments.58 Similarly, the Copyright Clear-
ance Center ("CCC") arranges licences for textual and other ma-
terials, exemplifying an organizational response to what would 
otherwise be high transaction costs.59 . Already, organizations 
have arisen to attempt to handle licensing transactions for digital 
materials circulated in cyberspace, including the CCC and oth-
ers.60 
3. New transaction types. 
The "absolute" amount of transaction costs, however, does 
not provide a complete picture. We really care about "high" or 
"low" costs relative to the value of the contract undertaken. That 
is, the important figure is the ratio of the transaction costs to the 
value of the rights being sought. For example, it would be ridicu-
lous for someone to spend $100 negotiating the rights to copy two 
pages from Time magazine for personal use; no reasonable person 
would value the right at $100, so transaction costs of that magni-
tude would be considered "high." But if one were going to repro-
duce the two pages in a text book and sell them to hundreds of 
thousands of students, then spending $100 to negotiate the rights 
would be considered quite low-because "low" would mean low in 
relation to the value of the rights being sought. 
Part of the problem of property in cyberspace is that the 
technology affects many variables. Clearly "transaction costs" in 
some cases will go down. But the "rights being sought" are also 
likely to change, because many new types of transactions are 
erty, 94 Colum L Rev 2655, 2661-63 (1994). 
68 See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The 
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 Tenn L Rev 75, 106 (1994); Paul Goldstein, The Brendan 
Brown Lecture: Copyright in the New Information Age, 40 Cath U L Rev 829, 835 (1991). 
1<9 See Note, Multiple Photocopying by Educators and the Fair Use Doctrine: The 
Court's Role in Reducing Transaction Costs, 1994 U Ill L Rev 387, 406-07. 
60 See The Author's Registry, http://www.webcom.com/registry. The Chronicle of 
Higher Education reports that some twenty companies and organizations are working to-
gether to ensure that whatever methods eventually are adopted for selling copyrighted 
material online are compatible with each other. The Electronic Rights Management Group 
hopes to enlist the support of hundreds of software developers, entertainment companies, 
and publishers in their efforts to protect copyrighted material from unauthorized retrans-
mission and to provide a way for copyright holders to collect payments for material 
dif!tributed electronically. Online, Chronicle Higher Educ A23 (Nov 10, 1995). See also the 
CCC site at http://www.copyright.com. 
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likely to be undertaken-or at least, many new uses of informa-
tional materials are likely to be made, whether transacted for or 
not. And that means that we will see a wide variety of ratios of 
transaction costs to the value of the rights sought. 
For example, it is already common today for individuals to 
copy e-mail messages or downloaded newspaper articles and 
circulate them to a hundred or a thousand others over an · 
· Internet "discussion list." Making and sending such copies would 
once have required time and thought, not to mention an expense 
for photocopying and mailing. But today, people do this literally 
with the push of a button. When this type of circulation was 
more costly, no one would do it unless it were worth the cost. 
Thus, such copies would not be made unless doing so brought the 
copier a fairly high value for the transaction. But when it takes 
only a second to accomplish the circulation, the value of making 
the circulation can be quite low and yet still be worth undertak-
ing. Indeed, many Internet users circulate entire news articles of 
the most marginal relevance to a discussion list simply because it 
is easy for them to do so. 
In short, transaction costs will certainly drop for some trans-
actions relative to what they would have been for the same trans-
action previously. But at the same time, all sorts of new and 
differently valued transactions will be undertaken. The picture of 
transactions in cyberspace is thus one of extraordinary dynamism 
and unpredictability. Insofar as future transactions are unpre-
dictable, the task is to design an entitlement system in the face 
of uncertainty: should we adopt liability rules or property rules 
for future transactions whose cost-to-value ratio is currently 
unpredictable? It works out that property rules have the advan-
tage. 
The typical liability rule in the Copyright Act is a compulso-
ry license.61 Two types of compulsory licenses appear in the 
Copyright Act: 1) very specific licenses with terms set by Con-
gress in consultation with affected industries; and 2) the general 
"fair-use" provision,62 which functions like a compulsory license 
provision with a royalty of zero. An example of the first type is 
the Copyright Act's allowance for the making of cover records, as 
discussed earlier.63 Anyone who wants to make such a record 
must pay the statutorily prescribed fee of "either two and three-
61 See notes 34-41 and accompanying text. 
6"2 17 usc§ 107 (1994). 
83 See note 35 and accompanying text. 
217] PROPERTY (AND COPYRIGHT) IN CYBERSPACE 241 
fourths cents, or one-half of one cent per minute of playing time 
or fraction thereof, whichever amount is larger."64 
· However, predefined damages that are appropriate for highly 
specified transactions are inappropriate when we are faced with 
unpredictable transaction types and values. If we do not know 
the types of transactions that will likely arise in cyberspace, then 
clearly we have no basis for enacting a liability rule with speci-
fied damages to apply in specified situations. At best, such a 
liability rule would have to function like liability rules for acci-
dent cases in tort, with damages determined after the fact in 
litigation or settlement. But to a large extent we already have 
this after-the-fact mechanism with the fair-use provision of the 
Copyright Act. Fair use is the quintessential "after the fact" de-
termination because everything turns on the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case.65 
This leaves the question whether a liability rule or a proper-
ty rule should apply in cyberspace for situations that 1) cannot 
be specified in advance, ~nd 2) are not otherwise amenable to a 
fair-use analysis. Transactions amenable to a fair-use analysis, 
though not precisely definable, tend to be those that are either 
trivial or undertaken for unusually worthy purposes, such as 
criticism, scholarship, research, and the like.66 Excluding such 
transactions, then, leaves the question whether a liability or a 
property rule would be best for transactions that we cannot now 
specify or define, that involve nontrivial uses of informational 
works, and that are not for especially worthy purposes. 
A liability rule such as a compulsory license for such transac-
tions makes no sense. Liability rules are appropriate when trans-
action costs are high, not when those costs are unknown or 
changing. In addition, liability rules carry a high price tag: the 
cost of litigation to determine, after the fact, the amount of dam-
ages. A property rule does not avoid all litigation, but it does put 
parties on notice that bargaining is called for and expected. Un-
like automobile accidents, which we hope are infrequent, transac-
tions over informational work in cyberspace are likely to be fre-
quent and desirable. An after-the-fact rule that requires litigation 
to determine damages would therefore be costly and unwise, 
particularly when we have a property-rule alternative. A fixed 
· 
64 17 USC§ 115(c)(2) (1994). 
65 See William F. Patry and Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Pre-
sumptions, and Parody, 11 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 667, 668-71 (1993). 
66 ld at 669 n 15. 
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compulsory license is similarly unwise because we are dealing by 
hypothesis with unpredictable transaction types and values. 
Finally, property rules for future, unpredictable transactions 
in cyberspace are more consistent with our copyright history. 
Compulsory licenses are exceptional in the broad scheme of copy-
right rights; most people understand that they are supposed to 
"get permission" to use copyrighted works. No precedent supports 
having a broad liability rule for unspecified transactions . with 
unspecified damages payments. 
Starting cyberspace with property rules has another advan-
tage: politically, it should be easier to "relax" a property rule and 
turn it into a liability rule in the future than to reverse that 
process. A change from a property rule to a liability rule takes 
away the need to bargain. Such a change would therefore be 
easier to impose than the reverse, which would require the cre-
ation of a duty to bargain where one previously did not exist. 
For many reasons, then, a property rule works better as the 
general presumption for cyberspace. This holds true whether the 
transaction costs for cyberspace transactions are low, as many 
appear to be; or are presently unpredictable because the ratio of 
transaction costs to the value of transactions cannot be predicted. 
B. Costs of Drawing and Monitoring Boundaries in Cyberspace 
The same general conclusion that property rules are desir-
able for informational works in cyberspace arises from analyzing 
the issues from the Demsetz and Ellickson perspective. The no-
tion of border drawing and its cost for informational works is 
more complex than for real property like land. At least four con-
cepts are at play when we think about identifying information 
"borders." 
First, the question arises whether we can track a unit of 
information as a separate entity and trace it to its author. This is 
comparable to the need for a title-recording system for land to 
identify parcel borders and owners. 
Second is the question whether we can· track alterations or 
elaborations to a unit of information-editing, rewriting, borrow-
ing concepts, and so on-and whether we can identify and trace 
the underlying work to its author. No close analog to real proper-
ty exists here, but tracking alterations to a work is a common 
problem in copyright litigation. 
Third is the problem of monitoring ''border crossings"-a far 
more troublesome problem for information than it is for land. 
With a parcel of real property, one can determine a trespass by 
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looking at the border to see if anyone crosses it. To be sure, it 
may not be feasible to watch large parcels of land twenty-four 
hours a day, every day, along every border. But with information, 
the problem is far worse: potential "trespassers" can be located 
anywhere. Posting guards at every one of the millions of comput-
ers connected to the Internet or at an online service is obviously 
out of the question for owners of information property. 
Fourth, Demsetz and Ellickson's reference to the cost of 
drawing borders is central to the question of when "property'' 
should be privately owned by individuals and households, rather 
than held in common by a "tribe" or "group" or "horde." It is a bit 
harder to see how this principle might apply to information in 
cyberspace, but it does apply nevertheless, and yields some inter-
esting insights. 
1. Tracking and tracing units of information. 
We will look first at the issue of drawing and monitoring 
borders in the sense of tracking and tracing a given unit of infor-
mation. Though I do not have empirical data to confirm the 
point, most of the information circulating in cyberspace appears 
to be readily identifiable as a "unit" of information. One thinks of 
e-mail, Usenet newsgroup postings, photographic images, write-
ups on "home pages," movie sound clips, computer programs, 
digitized "radio" programs, and so on. One can identify nearly all 
of these as demarcated units of information: they have begin-
nings, endings, and so on.67 And far more often than is true with 
real property like land, units of information in cyberspace either 
have or can have information included that identifies the author. 
To be sure, physical embodiments of informational works, 
such as books or video cassettes, may seem more concretely de-
marcated than electronic information. But the difference for these 
purposes is more apparent than real. Digitized information is 
almost invariably stored and communicated as a "file." A comput-
er "file" consists of a bounded piece of information with a begin-
ning and an end. Software for operating systems-such as DOS, 
Windows, or MAC-OS-as well as for communications, depends 
on the computer's ability to .locate beginning and end points for 
67 It is easy to fool oneself into thinking that because one can demarcate a lot of 
Internet information today as easily as non-Internet information, then necessarily the 
same will hold true tomorrow. Perhaps it will not. But I do not argue that there are no 
new problems to be addressed with property in cyberspace-I merely argue that most of 
those problems are likely to lie elsewhere than in defining the borders of a given "unit" of 
information. 
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such files. Hence an informational work in cyberspace can easily 
be bounded. 
Hypertext-linked information may seem to be an exception to 
this rule. A given document on the World Wide Web (''WWW''), 
for example, may consist of linked pieces of files, images, and 
sounds blended together into what appears to the viewer as a 
single document. One of the astonishing features of the World 
Wide Web is this ability to use hypertext links to generate the 
appearance of a single document from widely geographically 
dispersed component parts. This "document" might contain am-
biguous borders because of multiple constituent parts, each of 
which might reside on different computers in different places. 
But this apparent ambiguity is imaginary. To say that infor-
mation borders for hypertext are ill-defined would be to confuse 
the viewpoint of the viewer with that of the underlying software. 
The human viewer might not know which piece of information 
came from where, but the software pulling all the pieces together 
would (or could) know. The software could track the source of 
each component, record it, and even compute a bill cumulating 
the costs for each separate component if appropriate. Again, 
pending some major changes in the way computers store and 
access information, even small component parts of larger com-
pound documents can be separately· identifiable by WWW soft-
ware. 
Some information circulating in cyberspace is anonymous; 
such information might be trackable as a unit, but not traceable 
to its real author. But this is not a problem for drawing informa-
tion borders for purposes of establishing property rights. 68 Ano-
nymity is voluntary; those who want to claim ownership can 
choose not to be anonymous. Most of the issues regarding the 
protection of property in cyberspace likely will concern authors 
who want, either directly or through an enduring pseudonym or 
agent, to assert their authorship precisely so that they can retain 
some property rights. 
In addition, the fact that information in cyberspace is digi-
tized offers some new possibilities for technical means of identify-
ing works. One of the offshoots of research into public-key en-
cryption69 has been the development of "digital signatures," a 
68 It may be a problem for infringement of an author's rights, in the sense that an 
anonymous infringer cannot be sued. But anonymity is not a problem for anoq.ymous 
authors themselves. 
69 The White Paper describes public-key encrypting in the following way: 
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special form of encoding at the end of a document.70 This encod-
ing allows a recipient of information, that purports to be from 
author "X", to verify both that it is indeed from "X" and no one 
else, and also that the information remains exactly in the 
form-same text, same images, same formatting-in which it was 
sent. Digital signatures will help demarcate the -boundaries of 
informational works in cyberspace. 
Other new technologies can do even more. For example, the 
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights discusses the 
possible use of "copyright management information" as a special 
part of any digitized information. This special bit of text would: 
inform the user about the authorship and ownership of 
a work (e.g., attribution information) as well as to indi-
cate authorized uses of the work (e.g., permitted use 
information). For instance, information may be included 
A widely publicized technique for sending secure transmissions of data is "public 
key" encryption, This technique can be used to encrypt data using an algorithm 
requiring two particular keys-a "public" key and a "private" key, The two keys 
are affiliated with the recipient to which the information is to be sent The "pub-
lic" key is distributed publicly, while the private key is kept secret by recipient. 
Data encrypted using a person's public key can only be decrypted using that 
person's secret, private key. For instance, a copyright owner could encrypt a 
work using the public key of the intended recipient Once the recipient receives 
the encrypted transmission, he could then use his private key to decrypt that 
transmission. No secret (private) keys need to be exchanged in this transaction.· 
Without the private key of the intended recipient, the work cannot be read, ma-
nipulated or otherwise deciphered by other parties. Of course, if a decrypted 
copy is made and shared, then others. could manipulate the work unless other 
means are used to protect it. 
United States Department of Commerce, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellec-
tual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: Report of the Working Group 
on Intellectual Property Rights 176 (Sept 1995) ("White Paper") (cited in note 14) (empha-
sis omitted). See also A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the 
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U Pa L Rev 709, 890-94 (1995) (cited in note 22). 
70 The White Paper describes digital signitures as follows: 
Mathematical algorithms can also be used to create digital "signatures" that, in 
effect, place a "seal" on a digitally represented work. Generating a digital signa-
ture is referred to as "signing'' the work. The algorithms can be implemented 
through software or hardware, or both. The digital signature serves as means 
for authenticating the work, both as to the identity of the entity that authenti-
cated or "signed" it and as to the contents of the file that encodes the informa-
tion that constitutes the work. Thus, by using digital signatures one will be able 
to identify from whom a particular file originated as well as verify that the 
contents of that file have not been altered from the contents as originally dis-
tributed. 
White Paper at 177 (cited in note 14). 
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in an "electronic envelope" containing a work that pro-
vides information regarding authorship, copyright own-
ership, date of creation or last modification, and terms 
and conditions of authorized uses. 71 
In sum, it seems no harder to identify an informational work 
in cyberspace as a unit with ''boundary lines" than it is to identi-
fy a similar informational work elsewhere. Indeed, technical 
advances may make it even easier. 
2. Alterations to units of information. 
Another problem with informational works is that others 
besides the author may take an identifiable unit of such a work 
and change it. When is such a change "wrongful" in relation to 
property rights, and when is it not? Here again, nothing about 
cyberspace or property in informational works seems unique in 
this regard. Authors borrow from other authors' works all the 
time. An extremely close, almost literal, borrowing will be a copy-
right infringement; a loose borrowing of a basic plot idea will not 
be. Real property does not provide an especially good analogy 
here-though nuisance law is vaguely similar.72 But this whole 
area is a common problem in copyright law, a problem with 
which courts are quite familiar. 73 In copyright cases, the issue is 
whether an alleged infringer has copied "too much" from 
another's work.74 
Much of the problem of alterations stems from the fact that 
"ideas" are not protected by copyright-only the particular "ex-
pression" of those ideas is protected. Naturally, this dichotomy 
between idea and expression frequently raises questions in litiga-
71 Id at 180-81. 
72 If an a<ljacent landowner A emits smoke or odors that flow onto owner B's proper-
ty, in a sense A is using a part of B's property. 
73 See, for example, the classic formulation by Learned Hand in Nichols v Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F2d 119, 121 (2d Cir 1930) ("Upon any work, and especially upon a 
play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and 
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general 
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there 
is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise 
the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas', to which, apart from their expression, 
his property is never extended."). See also Paul Goldstein, 1 Copyright § 2.3 (Little, 
Brown, 2d ed 1996) (cited in note 36) (discussing the idea-expression distinction in defin-
ing a unit of information). 
74 See generally Arnstein v Porter, 154 F2d 464, 473 (2d Cir 1946) ("The question, 
therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiffs work so much of what is pleasing to 
the ears of lay listeners ... that defendant wrongly appropriated something which be-
longs to the plaintiff."); Goldstein, 2 Copyright at§ 7.3 (cited in note 36). 
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tion about which is which. Did the defendants take only ideas? 
Or did they take expression? Is a "plot" an expression or just an 
idea? Is the Macintosh computer interface just an idea?75 These 
issues are always troublesome in real cases; but for our purposes, 
they are neither more nor less troublesome in cyberspace. Hence, 
they do not push the analysis of property rights in cyberspace in 
any particular direction. Essentially, a property-rights 
scheme-copyright-works reasonably well outside of cyberspace 
to set limits on what can and cannot be borrowed from an infor-
mational work. At the very least, we can say that nothing about 
cyberspace suggests that a similar regime there will be any 
worse. 
3. Detecting trespasses. 
The problem in cyberspace may not be so much in identifying 
information borders for those who want in good faith to know 
about them or in assessing whether "too much" of a work has 
been used. The problem is likely to be detection in the first place 
of "trespasses" in cyberspace-that is, the unauthorized use of an 
informational work. As noted earlier, practical problems exist 
with policing very long borders of real property, but they seem to 
pale beside the problem of detecting "trespass" activities like 
unauthorized copying or uses of informational works. If these 
costs are excessive in cyberspace, they might argue against a 
private-property regime because such a regime would not be 
"worth it." 
Yet the argument for such ·a regime is still quite strong. 
First, we cannot be sure that the costs of detecting information-
property "trespasses" will be excessive. Detection can take a 
number of forms, including rewards and "hot lines" for concerned 
individuals to report suspected infringements. Software produc-
ers often learn about corporate infringements of commercial soft-
ware this way.76 This idea does not have much to do with tech-
nology or cyberspace, but it does remind us that human be-
ings-not technology-are still a major source of information 
about the activities of others. 
Second, in addition· to these "low technology'' means of detec-
tion, high technology sometimes lowers the cost of monitoring 
property borders. It certainly does with real property. Barking 
dogs, fences, and motion detectors often substitute for more ex-
75 See Nichols, 45 F2d at 121. 
76 Benjamin Wittes, BSA Duels with Pirates, Legal Times 539 (Apr 10, 1995). 
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pensive continuous human monitoring. Analogous technologies 
might serve the purpose of a ''border patrol" for informational 
works in cyberspace. One might think that digital-signature 
technology77 would serve this purpose, but it does not, because a 
digital signature does not stop a bad-faith recipient who wants to 
disguise the actual author. With present techniques, such a "sig-
nature" can readily be removed from the document with a simple 
text editor. At that point the possessor can edit the document 
and add a different digital signature t{) make it appear that he is 
the author. 
Other technologies may fare better, however. The White 
Paper, for example, discusses an intriguing technology known as 
"steganography"78-not to be confused with "stenography." This 
term describes the general use of techniques to "embed" identify-
ing information into a nontextual work-image, sound, video, and 
so on. The techniques do not embed the identifying information 
in a single place, the way a digital signature is located at the end 
of a document. Rather, the techniques enter the embedding infor-
mation more diffusely throughout a file in such a way that it is 
difficult to detect or modify. 79 With the proper software to ana-
lyze such a work, one can readily detect whether the work origi-
nated with a particular author or has been copied, even with 
alterations. 
With the rise of Internet programs based on the "Java" pro-
gramming language, 80 other means of detecting copying may be 
possible. Such programs ar.e downloaded over the WWW to a 
user's computer, where they run locally. Earlier methods of ac-
cessing the WWW rely on the downloading of relatively static 
I d. 
77 See note 68 and accompanying text. 
78 White Paper at 178-79 (cited in note 14). 
79 The White Paper describes steganography as follows: 
In essence, using steganographic techniques, a party can embed hidden messag-
es 1n digitized visual or audio data .... For example, one system modulates a 
known noise signal with the information to be embedded and adds the 'scaled' 
signal to the original data. Once encoded in this fashion, the steganographically 
encoded identification data is distributed throughout the work as subliminal 
noise and, like noise, cannot be fully eliminated from the work. Thus, one can 
ensure detection of an embedded message even after substantial corruption of 
the data, such as might occur through compression/decompression, encoding, 
alteration or excerpting of the original data. 
80 See http://java.sun.com/White Paper/java. whitepaper.l.html, § 6 (Sun 
Microsystems' home page for their white paper on the Java programming language). 
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documents. Such documents would, of course, have no way of 
"knowing'' when or whether they were being permanently copied 
or used in some other unauthorized way. With Java programs, 
however, a measure of "intelligence" is downloaded along with a 
document to the user's computer. Thus in theory, such a docu-
ment could keep track of its own unauthorized uses! This would 
certainly help to detect information-border "trespasses." 
Finally, instituting a legal regime of a particular form of 
property protection-called "contributory infringement" in copy-
right law-coupled with technologies for preventing unauthorized 
uses, can together lower the cost of detection and further justify 
reliance on a property-rights scheme. 
Some years ago, when Universal City Studios and Walt Dis-
ney Productions were worried about the possibility that every 
home owner would archive video copies of televised movies, the 
studios did not pursue those home owners directly. Rather, they 
proceeded, in Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios,81 
against a more centralized target: the producers of the video-
recording machines (''VCRs"), the bulk of which at that time were 
produced by the Sony Corporation. The studios argued-given 
that Sony did not directly infringe any rights in motion pictures 
by copying them itself-that the sale ofVCRs "contributed" to the 
infringement by the individuals who bought the VCRs and taped 
movies with them. 
The contributory-infringement doctrine arose from a more 
developed line of cases in patent law.82 The Sony Court held 
that the general outlines of the patent doctrine ·applied to copy-
right as well. 83 
The doctrine is far from a purely judicial construct. The 
Copyright Act allows contributory-infringement lawsuits, though 
not explicitly by that name. Section 106 provides that copyright 
owners have not only the exclusive right to do certain things 
themselves-reproduce, perform publicly, and so on-they also 
have the exclusive right to "authorize others" to do those same 
things.84 When one party facilitates another party's infringe-
81 464 us 417 (1984). 
82 See Dawson Chemical Co. v Rohm and Haas Co., 448 US 176, 179-80 (1980) ("The 
idea that a patentee should be able to obtain relief against those whose acts facilitate in-
fringement by others has been part of our law" for many years). See also Mercoid Corp. v 
Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 US 661 (1944); Snyder v Bunnell 29 F 47 (SD NY 
1886). 
83 Sony, 464 US at 439. 
84 17 usc§ 106 (1994). 
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ment, for example by selling a machine the only purpose of which 
is to make unlawful copies,85 the seller has infringed the copy-
right owner's exclusive right to "authorize others" to make copies. 
That is just the doctrine of contributory infringement by another 
name. 
In the Sony case, the lawsuit was ultimately unsuccessful 
because the Court found that the sale of VCRs in the main only 
contributed to home taping for "time-shifting'' purposes, which 
the Court concluded was a lawful fair use.86 But the case illumi-
nates one of the primary purposes of the contributory-infringe-
ment doctrine: to provide relief where direct infringers are too 
numerous or dispersed for the copyright owner to detect. 
This point is crucial to an understanding of the contributory-
infringement doctrine. A common response to the difficulty of 
monitoring "trespasses" to informational works is to assert that 
since copying is widespread and decentralized, we should give up 
efforts to stop it and accept it as a fact of life.87 But such a view 
misapprehends the relationship between copyright's contributory-
infringement doctrine and special-purpose technical restrictions 
on unauthorized uses. 
Copyright owners faced with the problem of detecting tres-
passers often respond with increased special-purpose technical 
restrictions. As noted above, these may take the form of signal 
scrambling, software copy-protection schemes, and the like. In 
reaction to these special restrictions, others typically create spe-: 
85 I have given an easy case: contributory infringement lies when the "only purpose" 
of a device is to help others to infringe a copyright. The actual test for contributory in-
fringement is the subject of current debate. The Supreme Court in the Sony case held that 
contributory infringement lies when a device has no "substantial noninfringing uses." 
Sony, 464 US at 456. The White Paper proposes a rule to ban the production of devices, 
the "primary purpose or effect" of which is to circumvent copyright-protection technolo-
gies. See White Paper at 219 (cited in note 14). Though not cast in the form of a "contribu-
tory-infringement" doctrine by name, the White Paper's proposal is essentially the same as 
a contributory-infringement provision. The proposed statutory language reads: 
No person shall import, manufacture or distribute any device, product, or com-
ponent incorporated into a device or product, or offer to perform any service, the 
primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or 
otherwise circumvent, without the authority of the copyright owner or the law, 
any process, treatment, mechanism or system whi~h prevents or inhibits the 
violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under section 106. 
Id app 1 at 6. 
86 Sony, 464 US at 442-55. 
87 See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking 
Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age, Wired Magazine 86 (Mar 1994). 
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cial devices or techniques to overcome the protective scheme. For 
example, when copy protection was more common on computer 
software, an industry developed for the production of tools to 
allow copying of protected software. 58 
In the absence of a contributory-infringement doctrine, the 
owner would have to develop newer or more sophisticated tech-
niques to counteract the new industry and prevent unauthorized 
copying. Presumably, in time, these newer techniques would 
themselves be met by yet more sophisticated devices to perform 
unauthorized copying. The cycle would repeat as long as the 
value of the information were high enough to justify the owner's 
investment in newer special-purpose technical restrictions. 
The problem with this scenario is that it constitutes a kind 
of wasteful "arms race" of technological-protection schemes, with 
each side increasing its spending to outperform the other's tech-
nology. This race is wasteful because informational works require 
limits on copying to provide incentives for their creation. If tech-
nological protection looks costly ex ante, valuable works will 
never be created in the first place. 
The purpose of the contributory-infringement doctrine is to 
put a limit on the arms race of technological protection. The 
doctrine gives the owner of the informational work an alternative 
·to ever-increasing spending on technology. Whenever litigation, 
with its resulting deterrent effect, appears to be preferable to 
greater technological restrictions, owners can switch to litigation 
and enforce their property rights. Thus when coupled with spe-
cial-purpose technical restrictions, the contributory-infringement 
doctrine forces a centralization of infringing activities and makes 
enforcement more cost effective. 
A special-purpose technical restriction raises the costs of 
copying. These increased costs will be partly financial and partly 
"cost of knowledge." For example, producing a device that can 
descramble satellite signals requires a fairly sophisticated knowl-
edge of signal technology, and it requires the production and 
distribution of the "black box" necessary to effect the 
descrambling. This box must be stocked in inventory and adver-
tised. All these activities greatly increase the visibility of this 
means of "trespassing'' on the signal-owner's property. Thus the 
special-purpose technical restriction converts what would other-
88 See Vault Corp. v Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F Supp 750, 752 (E D La 1987) (involv-
ing litigation between a manufacturer of security software and a company that sells 
software to "unlock" PROLOK) 
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wise be a decentralized series of hard-to-detect infringements 
into a more centralized activity. The contributory-infringement 
doctrine enables owners to enforce their exclusive ownership 
rights against the now easier-to-detect trespasser. 
Cyberspace does not change that proc~ss as long as the con-
tributory-infringement doctrine is preserved. Indeed, since elec-
tronic communications are used so extensively, the possibilities 
for decentralized infringement are even greater than before. The 
contributory-infringement doctrine should therefore be 
strengthened to ·help convert all these decentralized infringe-
ments to more centralized, detectable ones. It is therefore no 
surprise that the White Paper proposes to do just that. 89 
. For the purposes of this Article and its focus on property 
rights, we are looking at the cost of detecting "trespasses"-that 
is, unauthorized copying of informational works in cyberspace. 
This section has shown that the cost of detecting informational-
border trespasses is likely to be low, despite popular expectations 
to the contrary. Detection can be accomplished through rewards 
for disclosure; through a variety of technological means like digi-
tal signatures and steganography; and finally through reliance on 
the contributory-infringement doctrine coupled with technological 
measures. Once again, therefore, the costs of detection do not 
seem unusually high in cyberspace; once again, the absence of a 
high-cost structure argues in favor of a property-rights scheme. 
4. Externalities and group ownership. 
Demsetz argues that, with any property, the actions of some 
members of society can have external effects: positive benefits or 
negative costs.90 With communally held property, overcoming 
these externalities requires that the entire community agree on 
the rules. This agreement usually entails significant transaction 
costs and engenders the problems of holdouts. 
Ellickson elaborates on the problems of group-held property 
and stresses a serious risk of shirking. 91 If the group wants to 
ensure that commonly held property is put to wise and produc-
tive uses, it must have careful rules about appropriate conduct by 
all members, and it must also keep watch over all the members 
89 See White Paper at 219 (cited in note 14). 
90 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347, 347-48 
(1967) (cited in note 1). 
91 Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1348-49 (cited in note 5). 
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to ensure that they follow these rules. This is a familiar applica-
tion of the idea of "free riding'' or the prisoners' dilemma. 
Private property, in contrast, entails no free riding. All the 
costs and benefits are centered on the property owner, without 
externalities to diminish that owner's incentives to work. As 
Ellickson puts it, private-property owners can monitor trespass-
ers who cross a border more cheaply than they can stand guard 
to see whether someone else is working enough or is shirking.92 
Our current copyright system features a parallel notion. The 
analog to "private property," in the sense of individually held 
property, is the placing of exclusive rights in the hands of a sin-
gle author. The analog to "public" or group-held property is the 
placing of copyright rights in the hands of large groups other 
than the author. The "exclusive" rights of the author under the 
Copyright Act include the rights of reproduction, preparation of 
derivative works, public distribution, public performance, public 
display, and limited rights to attribution and integrity.93 But the 
public holds "group rights" as well. Fourteen other provisions of 
the Copyright Act extensively compromise the author's rights, 
either with compulsory-license provisions94 or with outright ex-
ceptions to those rights-such as "fair use";95 performances at 
agricultural fairs, horticultural fairs, or exhibitions;96 education-
al copying;97 first sale;98 and public performances for education-
al, religious, or charitable purposes.99 
These exceptions to the author's exclusive rights are often 
cast in the form of activities-performances at agricultural fairs, 
for instance-rather than groups. But in practice, behind this 
surface description one can see the results of interest-group rep-
resentation in the legislative-drafting process. 100 An exception 
for agricultural fairs certainly seems designed to benefit those 
who are engaged in agriculture. An exception for educational 
photocopying is designed to benefit educators. One can view these 
92 Id at 1327-28. 
93 17 USC §§ 106, 106A (1994). 
94 See notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
96 17 usc§ 107 (1994). 
96 17 USC § 110(6) (1994). One also might characterize these exceptions as a kind of 
"compulsory license," albeit one that prescribes a damages liability of zero dollars. 
97 Note that the guidelines concerning "educational photocopying" are not part of the 
statute, but spring from the general fair-use provision of section 107. 
98 17 usc§ 109 (1994). 
99 17 usc§ 110(4) (1994). 
100 See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell 
L Rev 857, 870-79 (1987). 
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exceptions as a kind of group ownership by members of the ag-
ricultural and educational businesses. Similarly, the right to rent 
computer software was "acquired" as private property by comput-
er-software companies during the legislative process101-a right 
that book publishers did not acquire, and hence that remains a 
"group" property interest of the public. 
We can easily discover the significance of viewing the Copy-
right Act's exceptions as a form of "group" ownership of rights. 
Both Demsetz and Ellickson, when they discuss the reasons for 
private property, focus on the transaction costs of getting large 
groups to agree. The costs of reaching agreement are often high 
with real property; a regime of private property helps to over-
come these costs. · 
Property rights in informational works, however, differ from 
those in real property on precisely this point. Land, like most 
real and tangible property, evidences the attribute of "rivalrous 
consumption." That is, one individual's use of a given plot of land, 
for a given purpose prevents the simultaneous use by another for 
other purposes. Group ownership ofland entails high transaction 
costs because the whole group must agree on those uses ahead of 
time. 
With informational works, the same problem does not seem 
to follow. Informational works are a type of "public good," that is, 
a good that evidences "nonrivalrous consumption." One person in 
a group may use an informational work without impeding 
another's simultaneous use. On the face of it, then, once group 
ownership of an informational work has been determined, the 
group should not have to experience any transaction costs at all. 
Each member of the group can fully exercise all rights to the 
informational work without fear that other group members are in 
any way excluded from doing the same. 
Yet, surprisingly, group ownership of public goods like infor-
mational works does exhibit the problem of group transaction 
costs-just not at the stage when the informational work is being 
used. Rather, the transaction costs occur at the stage when the 
group rights to the informational work are first defined. This is, 
101 See Computer Software Rental Amendments Act, Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong, 2d Sess (1990); Computer Software Rental Amendments 
Act of 1989, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong, 1st Sess (1989). 
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in short, the stage when Congress amends or redrafts the copy-
right statute. 
A moment's reflection will show this to be true. The legisla-
tive process surrounding every major revision to the Copyright 
Act well illustrates the high transaction costs entailed in group 
ownership. For example, Congress undertook both the 1909 and 
the 1976 Copyright Act revisions partly because of changing 
technologies. 102 In each of these efforts, both the Copyright Of-
fice and Congress held frequent and prolonged hearings, involv-
ing dozens of groups, interests, and experts. 
The revision effort for the 1909 Act began in 1906 and lasted 
until 1909.103 The 1976 Act involved even larger transaction 
costs. The process of revision began in 1955;104 quite literally 
more than twenty years were spent on the effort. Countless num-
bers of individuals, representing scores of interests and indus-
tries, were involved. In addition, government representatives 
exerted similar or greater efforts at the Copyright Office and in 
Congress. To be sure, not all the time and cost of the revision 
effort can be attributed to the cost of group negotiations over 
ownership of rights. 105 But those costs were very much a part of 
the overall effort. Indeed, the resulting 1976 Act can be described 
as taking its shape largely from the compromise of different 
group interests. 106 
I am not aware that anyone has tried to add up all the costs 
spent hammering out the rules of.copyright property ownership. 
Surely, however, the figure must be enormous. It represents the 
massive transaction costs of group ownership of copyright proper-
ty. 
Recently, we have similar examples. The current effort to 
update our copyright laws to accommodate cyberspace has not 
approached the scale of the major revisions accomplished in 1909 
102 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Or L Rev 
275, 282 (1989). 
103 Id at 284. 
1o. Id at 279. 
105 Preparation of the scholarly and influential Studies on Copyright, for example, took 
"[s]ix years of dedicated and untiring effort on the part of many persons, ... supported by 
Congressional appropriations of $100,000, the services of Copyright Office personnel, and 
the contributed advice of many members of the copyright bar." 1 Studies on Copyright ix 
(Rothman, Arthur Fisher mem ed, 1963). It would be unfair to account for all of the 
scholarly time by individual authors as part of the cost of group negotiations over copy-
right. Yet, in a sense, these authors must have undertaken the studies at least in part 
because they anticipated the elaborate negotiation process among all affected parties that 
was certain to ensue. 
106 Litman, 72 Cornell L Rev at 870-71 (cited in note 100). 
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and 1976. Yet, a single document, the National Information In-
frastructure ("Nil") Task Force's Green Paper, received 1,500 
pages of written comments from 150 individuals and organiza-
tions over a four-month period.107 With such attention over a 
107 The White Paper reported the details of reaching group consensus as follows: 
The Working Group held a public hearing in November 1993, at which 30 
witnesses testified. The Working Group also solicited written comments and 
received some 70 statements during a public comment period which closed on 
December 10, 1993. Following its review of the public comments and analysis of 
the issues, the Working Group released a preliminary draft of its report ("Green 
Paper") on July 7, 1994 .... Thousands of copies of the Green Paper were dis-
tributed in paper form as well as electronically via the IITF Bulletin Board. 
Following the release of the Green Paper, the Working Group heard testimony 
from the public in four days of hearings in Chicago, Los Angeles and Washing-
ton, D.C., in September 1994. In addition, more than 1,500 pages of written 
comments on the Green Paper and reply comments were filed, in paper form 
and through the Internet, by more than 150 individuals and organiza-
tions-representing more than 425,000 members of the public-during the com-
ment period, which extended over four months. 
The Working Group convened a Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) to bring 
together copyright owner and user interests to discuss fair use issues and, if 
possible, to develop guidelines for uses of copyrighted works by librarians and 
educators. Some 60 interest groups are participants in the Conference and have 
been meeting regularly since September 1994 in sessions that are open to the 
public. The Working Group also kicked off a Copyright Awareness Campaign 
(CAC) in March 1995. Approximately 40 participating individuals and organiza-
tions are coordinating their educational efforts and joining with the Working 
Group and the Department of Education to raise public awareness of copyright. 
Meetings of the Campaign are also open to the public. Interested parties had 
numerous opportunities to submit their views on the intellectual property impli-
cations of the development and use of the Nil and on the Working Group's 
Green Paper, including its preliminary findings and recommendations. The open 
process instituted by the Working Group resulted in a well-developed, volumi-
nous record indicating the views of a wide variety of interested parties, includ-
ing various electronic industries, service providers, the academic, research, li-
brary and legal communities, and individual creators, copyright owners and 
users, as well as the computer software, motion picture, music, broadcasting, 
publishing and other information and entertainment industries. 
White Paper at 3-5 (cited in note 14). 
Recently, another time-consuming effort has gone into specifying fair-use guidelines 
for the electronic age: 
Efforts by educators to produce nationally recognized guidelines on the "fair use" 
of copyrighted materials in digital form hit a snag last week when the Associa-
tion of American Publishers balked at ... language that would have allowed a 
college to make limited use of copyrighted works over its computer network 
without the copyright owner's permission .... [One AAP Vice President] cited 
concerns that even for a controlled network, "Current technology is not able to 
prevent a recipient from further distributing copies or altering the content." 
Robert L. Jacobson, Publishers' Group Balks at Key Provision in Proposed Guidelines on 
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fairly modest effort, it is no surprise that we went sixty-seven 
years between major revisions to our property rules for copy-
right!108 
. These high costs of group agreement are not just costly in 
themselves; they also have the unanticipated and unhappy by-
product of ensuring that our property rules for informational 
works quickly become out of date. Once various groups have 
invested enormous sums in negotiations with each other and 
with Congress, they will make business decisions and business 
investments on the basis of the results. Industries will arise and 
be shaped by these results. The industries will have a vested in-
terest in keeping the rules of the game the same.109 In a way, 
this is simply an example of the need to "amortize" the cost of ne-
gotiations over a sufficiently long period so that the expenses of 
reaching agreement can be recouped. 110 
Congress does not itself need to "recoup" its costs in the 
same way, but there is also a limit to the time and attention that 
members of Congress can pay to any one issue. And the longer 
and more exhaustive a legislative issue like copyright becomes, 
the less often Congress will consider major changes to it. 
In an era of rapid technological change, it may be that Con-
gress should revise the Copyright Act more thoroughly more 
often. But none of the participants-industries, lobbying groups, 
or the Congress itself-has much incentive to undertake such 
revisions,. because doing so would render their previous efforts 
and current industry structure wasted. Consequently, the high 
costs of group decision making ensure that the Copyright Act will 
be long out of date before it can be revised appropriately. 
Congress could remedy this problem by creating private, not 
group-held, property rights for informational works. If Congress 
assignedmore of the rights to the author, and fewer rights to 
other groups like educators, libraries, cable television, and agri-
cultural-fair exhibitors, then these group decision-making costs 'of 
"Fair Use", Chronicle Higher Educ A23 (Dec 15, 1995). . 
· 
108 We do not wait so long for minor revisions, however. This is particularly true for 
those revisions that tend to affect only newcomers to the copyright world without altering 
rights for existing parties. In fact, the Copyright Act has seen hundreds of minor 
amendments since 1976. See Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home 
Copying: Technology Challenges the Law 3 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989). 
109 See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II 245 (Cambridge, 1989). 
110 It is not literally a case of "amortizing," because lobbying expenses are sunk costs 
that per se would not influence future decisions. But industry undertakes such costs on 
the expectation that they will yield a future stream of benefits and that industry practices 
will develop around them. 
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lobbying during the legislative process could be greatly reduced, 
and the Act could be amended more frequently.m 
Some may object that Congress cannot realistically reduce 
' the number of group-held copyrights because the copyright laws 
affect too many industries and people. This is true to some ex-
tent. But the usual explanation gets it precisely backwards. Com-
mentators often argue that because such a large number of 
stakeholders are involved in copyright-authors, publishers, 
libraries, educators, online services, and so on-Congress must be 
willing to balance copyright rights among them all. 112 But the 
reverse is more accurate: because Congress has shown a willing-
ness to balance rights among them all, it has created a large 
number of stakeholders. And Congress has created these 
stakeholders precisely because it assumes we have assumed that 
copyright rights must be group owned, and hence group defined, 
instead of "privately" owned. 
Of course, many copyright rights are "privately" owned-they 
belong exclusively to the author. I am not suggesting that "group" 
or "private" ownership is a binary concept. It is not all or noth-
ing. Rather, I am suggesting that to the extent that copyright 
rights are group owned, Congress has created higher-than-neces-
sary transaction costs. whenever the process of defining or 
amending those rights is once again undertaken. 
CONCLUSION 
Would-be authors need an incentive to create informational 
works. These incentives come in a variety of flavors. One impor-
tant class of such incentives consists of the assurance that others 
m Of course, many commentators will argue that Congress should not give more 
rights to authors because this is contrary to the interest of the largest affected group: the 
public. I do not share that view, but my point in the text is not to suggest who should or 
should not have rights. Rather, my point is that group ownership of copyright rights car-
ries high and under-appreciated costs-negotiating costs and the additional cost of an 
outdated Copyright Act. 
112 See Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Elec-
tronics and Information 285 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986). Compare Goldstein, 
1 Copyright § 1.14 (cited in note 36) (expressing the balancing of interests as authors 
against other authors who want to make use of the first authors' works for further cre-
ative efforts). Goldstein follows the economic formulation flrst put forward by William 
Landes and Richard Posner, rather than expressing the balance as between creators and 
users. See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325 (1989). For an example of an article expressing the contrary 
view, that the balance is between creators and users, see Pamela Samuelson, Modifying 
Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to Accommodate a Technology, 28 
Jurimet J 179 (1988). 
;. 
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have a limited ability to make unauthorized uses of the_ informa-
tional work. Limitations on the ability of others to copy a work 
include the legal protection of the work as an entitlement, con-
tractual agreements, the current state-of-the-copying art, and 
special-purpose technical restrictions. 
The current state-of-the-copying art for digital materials in 
cyberspace appears to pose very little limitation on unauthorized 
copying. Digital works can be exactly and perfectly copied; this 
accounts for much of the present-day concern with strengthening 
or clarifying copyright rights. Increased entitlement protection 
may be necessary to offset this decline of practical restrictions on 
copying and hence preserve the existing balance of copyright 
rights. Special-purpose technical restrictions like encryption can 
also help, but they often trigger a technological "arms race" as 
others attempt to defeat the technical restrictions with yet more 
sophisticated technologies. Copyright's contributory-infringement 
doctrine provides a cost-effective legal alternative to increasing 
expenditures on such technologies. 
Since cyberspace puts renewed emphasis on the protection of 
informational works through legal entitlements, it is useful to 
look more closely at the nature of such a legal entitlement. Two 
different perspectives on property rights are useful in this regard. 
The first perspective is that of Calabresi and Melamed, who focus 
on the protection oflegal entitlements through property, liability, 
and inalienability rules. In this view, transaction costs are a 
crucial determinant of the appropriateness of property versus 
liability rules. Transaction costs appear to be falling quite rapidly 
in cyberspace. This fall implies that property rules will be most 
suitable for informational works in cyberspace. 
The second perspective is that of the economics of property 
. rights. This view, associated with Harold Demsetz and more 
recently with Robert Ellickson, concentrates on the costs of draw-
ing and monitoring boundaries, and on the costs of group owner-
ship of property versus individual ownership. 
Both the cost of drawing borders-identifying digital infor-
mation as one's own-and the cost of monitoring border tres-
passes-detecting unauthorized copying or alterations-seem to 
be no higher in cyberspace than they are for real property. They 
may even be lower in cyberspace thanks. to recent technological 
developments. A creator can easily demarcate a unit of informa-
tion, and techniques such as digital signatures can provide pow-
erful methods of identifying any alterations. Other techniques, 
such as digital "envelopes" and steganography, can help reveal 
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copying of certain informational works and can help make draw-
ing borders and identifying "trespasses" at least as easy as they 
are for noncyberspace informational works. 
Cyberspace covers a large geographic region, which raises 
the worrisome possibility that detecting remote "trespasses" to 
informational property will be difficult. This is the problem of 
"decentralized infringement" brought about by low-cost reproduc-
tion and use technologies like the Internet. Here again, however, 
special-purpose technical restrictions such as encryption, coupled 
with copyright's contributory-infringement doctrine, provide a 
manageable solution to the problem by forcing greater centraliza-
tion of infringing activities. 
Finally, the high costs of group decision making over real 
property are a principal justification for the institution of private 
property. Group ownership of informational works is also possi-
ble; our current Copyright Act provides for group ownership by 
limiting an author's rights to control certain uses, such as trans-
mission over cable television or performances at agricultural 
fairs. The assignment of such rights to groups does not at first 
appear to entail bargaining and negotiating costs because unlike 
land, informational property exhibits nonrivalrous consumption: 
any owner of a right can exercise it without preventing other 
owners from similarly exercising their rights. 
But extensive negotiating costs are nonetheless entailed in 
the assignment of group ownership to informational works. A 
closer analysis shows that these negotiating costs do not appear 
at the time that rights are exercised, but earlier, at the time such 
rights are acquired from Congress. In particular, the enormous 
costs of group ownership become manifest during legislative 
revisions of the Copyright Act, when interest groups, industries, 
and Congress argue for years over the assignment of rights. If 
Congress "privatized" property rights in informational works by 
concentrating them in the hands of authors, the number of copy-
right stakeholders would be greatly reduced, and group-owner-
ship costs would be greatly lessened. 
All the reasons put forth by Calabresi, Melamed, Demsetz, 
and Ellickson for the institution of private-property regimes point 
to the appropriateness and usefulness of a private-property re-
gime for informational works in cyberspace. The institution of 
such a regime-through a mechanism such as individually owned 
copyright rights-minimizes the inefficiencies of liability rules 
and group bargaining costs and consequently best promotes the 
development and usefulness of cyberspace. 
